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Restructuring the
VA Health Care System
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is a
system in transition, changing its focus, expanding its
activities, and restructuring its services. A system
rooted in specialty-based hospital services is being
replaced by one built on ambulatory and primary care.
While the original focus of the Veterans Administration
(now the Department of Veterans Affairs but still
referred to as the VA) was providing hospital care for
veterans with service-connected disabilities, eligibility
over the years has been expanded to include both
inpatient and outpatient care for veterans with nonservice-connected disabilities as well. From a centralized budgeting and decision making system that was
often slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive to local
concerns, the VHA has now moved to a decentralized
network system.
Driving these reforms are the myriad changes taking
place within the larger healthcare system and within
government, particularly budgetary constraints in the
face of rising healthcare costs, the growth of managed
care, increasing competition for the healthcare dollar, a
government-wide effort to reduce the budget deficit,
and the needs of an aging population of veterans.1
Although these changes are affecting all sectors of the
healthcare system, they pose particular challenges for
the VHA. In 1995, the VHA began to respond to these
various challenges and enunciated a vision and a
blueprint for restructuring in Vision for Change.2
The Department of Veterans Affairs relies almost
exclusively on federal appropriations for its operating
costs. Historically, Congress has had a strong and stable
commitment to veterans, and the attitude of the VA has
been said to be one of “we ask, you give.” As John
Iglehart notes, “Time and again, politicians of every
stripe reaffirmed their belief—reinforced by the veterans’ lobby—that veterans are served better medically
through a separate system.”3 However, operating within
a shrinking budget environment and facing competing
claims on the federal dollar, the VA has been receiving
a diminishing proportion of the federal budget. In fiscal
year (FY) 1977, VA spending was 5 percent of total
federal spending; in FY 1996, that percentage was
reduced to 2.5.4 Furthermore, although the shift to
managed care has had major implications for the
practice of medicine in the private sector, providers
there have never been totally insulated from cost
implications. In contrast, VA physicians have been

cushioned from decisions relative to costs and, since
budgets were based on historical costs, the incentives
were never in the direction of cost control.
Changes in the demographic composition of veterans pose another major challenge for the VA. There are
currently 26 million veterans, but their numbers are
declining and their average age, currently 57.7 years, is
increasing. It is projected that there will be 26 percent
fewer veterans by the year 2010 but that 40 percent of
the veterans alive then will be over the age of 65.
Between 1990 and 2010, the number of veterans over
the age of 85 is expected to grow from 154,000 to 1.3
million.5 This substantial growth among the “old old”
will generate considerable new demand on both the
acute and the long-term care components of the VA.
Fundamental questions about the role and future of
the VHA are coming from many sectors. Even Kenneth
W. Kizer, M.D., M.P.H., the under secretary for health
at the Department of Veterans Affairs and the main
architect of the changes taking place, recently asked:
In a country where health care delivery is primarily a
private-sector function, should the federal government
be in the business of directly providing health care?
How much should the government spend for veterans
hospitals and other capital assets, and should these be
exclusively for the use of veterans?6

In fact, since his arrival in Washington in late 1994
from California, Kizer has been challenging the prevailing philosophy of the VHA and reshaping the system,
modelling it on a managed care plan with an emphasis
on prevention, primary care, and case management.
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This Forum session will examine the changes under
way in the VHA and their implications for the veterans
served and the stakeholders of the system. The discussion will focus on the appropriateness of a managed
care model for the various veteran populations and the
extent to which the VA is fulfilling its multiple missions, given the transformation now taking place. In
light of recurring suggestions to integrate the VHA and
mainstream medicine and proposals for Medicare to pay
for services provided to beneficiaries over the age of 65,
the Forum will also examine how the VHA is coping
with the reconfiguration of the larger marketplace
relative to the population it serves.

BACKGROUND
The modern VA healthcare system began during
World War I with the establishment of hospitals to treat
combat-related injuries and to rehabilitate veterans with
service-connected disabilities. A second role was added
to the VHA in 1924 during a period of excess hospital
capacity. Veterans service organizations (VSOs)
successfully lobbied for free hospital care for medically
indigent veterans without service-connected disabilities.
Permitting access to such low-income veterans placed
the VA in the role of a safety net provider. During the
1940s and 1950s, two additional missions were added
by Congress: health professions education and medical
research. Both were intended to enhance the quality of
care provided in VA institutions. More recently, Congress has charged the VA with the responsibility of
participating in the nation’s response to national emergencies.
From a modest start and a narrow focus, the VA has
grown to be one of the nation’s largest healthcare
systems, now having 173 hospitals, nearly 600 outpatient clinics, 133 nursing homes, 40 domiciliaries, 206
counseling centers, and 185,000 employees. The
percentage of veterans served depends upon the population considered eligible for service. The Government
Accounting Office (GAO) reports that these facilities
serve about 10 percent of the total veteran population
each year.7 Yet VA health care is not an entitlement for
all 26 million veterans. Congress appropriates resources
and specifies the priorities of veterans for care, within
available resources. The highest priority, “mandatory”
veterans, are those with service-connected disabilities
and the poor. Almost all (95 percent) of the more than
2.5 million veterans the VA treats annually come from
within this “mandatory” subgroup of only 9.5 million
veterans. The VA and many VSOs view this highpriority, mandatory population as the VHA’s primary

service population. Because not all persons need or
seek care in any one year, the VA has served about 35
percent of the individuals in this mandatory population
over the past three years.
There are many indications of change in VHA
services. The number of inpatient days has been declining dramatically over the past three years. Although the
number of patients served has increased, annual admissions have decreased by more than 250,000 since 1994
and the number of outpatient visits has increased by
more than 6.6 million. The VA has diminished the
centrality of the hospital, making it “a component of a
larger, more coordinated community-based network of
care.”8 Additionally, says the VHA, over 77 percent of
the eligible population can identify a primary care
provider, productivity standards and clinical care
outcome measures are being developed, VHA staffing
has declined 13 percent, 42 hospitals have been merged
into 20 local systems, and more attention is being paid
to customer satisfaction.

MULTIPLE MISSIONS
In contrast to private-sector managed care organizations, the VA has four statutory missions, each vying for
attention and resources. While its patient care mission is
the primary focus, it must be balanced with the three
other congressionally mandated responsibilities.

Patient Care
The first mission of the VA is to provide health care
to eligible veterans. In light of the changes in the veteran
population, the role of safety net provider has assumed
prominence. Typically, veterans who utilize VA services are older, poorer, and more likely to have a psychiatric diagnosis, and they have a high incidence of substance abuse disorders. Homeless veterans accounted
for 13.5 percent of all hospital admissions in FY 1996
and 47 percent of substance abuse admissions.9 In fact,
the VA is the nation’s largest direct provider of services
to the homeless.10 This function is often referred to as
the VA’s “fifth mission” although it is not mandated by
statute. Of the more than 2.5 million veterans served
annually, 70 percent have incomes under $21,610 per
year.11 The GAO notes, “From its roots as a system to
treat war injuries, VA health care has increasingly
shifted toward a system focused on treating low-income
veterans with medical conditions unrelated to military
service.”12 In FY 1995, only about 12 percent of the
patients treated in VA hospitals received treatment for
service-connected disabilities and another 28 percent

4
had service-connected disabilities but were treated for
conditions not related to those problems. Almost all the
rest were poor and had no service-connected condition.
It is for just these patients, asserts Kizer, that a role will
always exist for the VHA. He estimates that about a
quarter of the veteran population, those who are most
socially compromised—the poor, the homeless, the
mentally ill, and substance abusers—will never be
attractive to private-sector providers. Writing in Health
Affairs, Nancy J. Wilson and Kizer note that “as long as
local market forces dominate the healthcare industry and
state and local funding vary, the stabilizing influence of
a national safety net like the VA healthcare system
becomes ever more important.”13
The shift in the site of care from in-hospital to
outpatient services is reflected in utilization patterns.
Between FY 1994 and FY 1997, the number of acute
care admissions to VA hospitals fell 247,412, or 24
percent. During that same period, the number of outpatient visits increased by 23 percent, from 26.0 million to
32.6 million, according to the VHA.
The aging of the veteran population is evidenced by
the increase in nursing home care. The number of
veterans in VA nursing homes and VA-supported state
nursing homes increased 27 percent between 1990 and
1996, from 42,175 to 53,550 veterans. Most of that
increase was in VA-supported state nursing homes.
Demand for the Blind Rehabilitation Service is increasing too as a result of the aging population. The service
was initially developed to rehabilitate veterans blinded
in combat. Most blind veterans currently using these
services have lost their sight as a result of degenerative
conditions. It has been suggested that the safety net
provider role will become even more significant for this
population as conventional insurance does not adequately cover blind rehabilitation.14

Health Professions Education
The second statutory mission of the VA is health
professions education and training. The VA provides
clinical opportunities to more than 100,000 students and
trainees in more than 40 disciplines. About 54,000
nurse, dentist, optometrist, podiatrist, physical and
occupational therapist, psychologist, and other trainees
rotate through VA programs each year. In addition, the
VHA reports that 34,000 medical residents and 22,000
medical students rotate through the VA healthcare
system annually.
Currently, according to the VHA, 107 of the nation’s 125 medical schools have affiliation agreements

with 131 VA medical centers. Ten thousand VA
clinicians have academic appointments and a similar
number of academic faculty direct or provide care for
veterans and teach residents and students. The VA
funds over 8,500 medical residency positions, approximately 11 percent of all positions in the nation. The role
of the VA in medical training is so pervasive that,
according to VA estimates, more than 65 percent of all
physicians currently practicing in the United States have
received all or part of their training through the VA.
This arrangement benefits the VA by strengthening
the VHA’s workforce, supplementing its clinical
expertise, and increasing its ability to attract highquality talent. In fact, one VA neurologist has noted that
medical school affiliations have been the salvation of
the VA and that quality standards would not be maintained without these relationships.15 In return, the VAsupported residency positions have provided medical
schools with additional sources of support for patient
care, teaching, and clinical research. The VA also
provides medical schools with training sites and,
especially important at this time, with ambulatory
training sites.
The response to consolidation of services in Chicago
VA hospitals is one illustration of the significance of
the VA to medical schools. The strategy of consolidation is being pursued by the VA to promote efficiency.
There is general agreement that duplication within the
system can be eliminated and that savings can be
achieved by hospital consolidation, or as the VA calls
it, integrations. However, according to an article in the
Chicago Tribune, efforts to consolidate two VA hospitals met with a “howl” of protest from the Chicago
campus of the University of Illinois School of Medicine, which has enjoyed a long affiliation with the VA’s
West Side Hospital. School officials were fearful that
the VHA planned to transfer West Side’s medical and
surgical units to the VA’s North Side facility, Lakeside
Hospital, an affiliate of the University of Illinois’ rival,
Northwestern University Medical School. The dean of
the University of Illinois warned that if West Side
Hospital were left as an ambulatory care facility, “it
would gut the medical program at the country’s largest
medical school.”16 In July 1997, Chicago congressional
representatives forced a hearing that put the entire
process of consolidations on trial. The GAO testified on
behalf of a more comprehensive approach rather than
the incremental one being used by the VA. Although
the GAO, as well as all others testified to the importance of stakeholder involvement, they acknowledged
how difficult it had been for the competing medical
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schools to address this issue and suggested using
independent planners with no vested interests in the
geographic area.17
The alignment of the affiliations between medical
schools and VA medical centers and the nature of
residency training have been caught up in the whirl of
change that is affecting all segments of the VA. Like
the rest of American medicine, the VA’s healthcare
system has been dominated by specialists. Now, however, the mandate to enroll all eligible veterans and
assign each to a primary care provider is increasing the
demand for primary care physicians and diminishing the
need for specialists. In some cases, specialists are
assuming these primary care responsibilities; in other
cases, the ranks of specialists are being decreased
through attrition or release.
To further support the shift to primary care, the
VHA’s Residency Realignment Committee, chaired by
Robert Petersdorf, M.D., a noted former medical school
dean and past chairman of the Association of American
Medical Colleges, recommended eliminating 250
residency positions in disciplines other than primary
care. The committee further recommended shifting 750
residency positions from specialty disciplines to primary care as defined by the VA. This realignment
would increase the number of primary care positions to
49 percent of all VA residency positions.18
The VHA is in the process of implementing the
recommendations contained within the committee's
final report. However, in so doing, primary care has
been defined as a “philosophy and method of care
delivery” and not as a set of disciplines. Noting that it
may be more appropriate for specialists with primary
care skills to care for patients with chronic illnesses, the
VA has launched two new initiatives to train specialists
in primary care. The first program focuses on eight
specialty areas, among which are rheumatology,
gastroenterology, and neurology. The second program
covers residency training in general psychiatry, geriatric
psychiatry, and addiction psychiatry. It is anticipated
that residents completing those programs will demonstrate primary care competencies such as the ability to
assess and manage common diseases and the ability to
implement health promotion and disease prevention
strategies.19

Research
The statutory mission of research was added to the
VHA in 1958. Its programs have been responsible for
many innovations in medical practice that go beyond

the veteran community. Among the many breakthroughs developed through the VA have been the first
artificial kidney, the development of the cardiac pacemaker and the first successful liver transplant; isotopic
medicine procedures that detect thyroid disorders; and
prosthetic devices, such as hydraulic knees and the
robotic arm. The Geriatric Research, Education, and
Clinical Centers (GRECCs) that integrate service,
education, and research for the aging veteran population
have made the VA a leader in geriatric care.
By congressional mandate, the VHA’s research
program is obligated to include biomedical research,
mental illness research, prosthetic and other rehabilitative research, and health services research. It is also
stipulated that the research be consonant with the VA’s
healthcare mission and correspond to veterans’ specific
needs. Aggregate support for the research program is
approximately $1 billion. Included in that amount in FY
1997, according to the VHA, was $262 million from a
specific congressional appropriation for the VA’s
intramural research program, $397 million from extramural grants, and $320 million in indirect support from
the medical care budget. It is expected that the percentage of funding for research from sources outside of the
VHA will increase as it pursues collaborative partnerships. One example of this collaboration is the VHA’s
partnership with the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation,
which is providing matching funding for diabetesrelated research.
Vision for Change, the blueprint for the VHA’s
restructuring, called for an examination of the VHA’s
research effort and a determination of whether research
dollars were being properly allocated. The report of the
Research Realignment Committee, issued in October
1996, suggested a reordering of research priorities by
establishing designated research areas (DRAs). These
areas would be those in which
the VA has a particularly strong strategic interest
because of the prevalence of conditions within the VA
patient population, the uniqueness of a specific patient
population and its disease burden to the VA system,
or the importance of the question to health care
delivery within the VA.

The committee recommended establishing 13 DRAs,
among which are dementias; substance abuse; central
nervous system and associated diseases, including
spinal cord dysfunction and traumatic brain injury; and
cancer. It further recommended that a national research
advisory council be established to revise these priority
areas as necessary and to designate relative funding
levels for the DRAs.20
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The ability to monitor the nature of research priorities will be a challenge for the VHA. However, as the
veteran population ages and the disease burden increases or shifts, it will be critical for the VHA to
address these issues through research and service. The
GRECCs in particular have been a successful model for
coordinating research, education, and service although
they have never been expanded to their full complement
of 25. The VSOs have recommended establishing one
GRECC dedicated to research on the care of elderly
patients with spinal cord injuries.21 A new series of
specialized mental health centers, Mental Illness
Research, Education, and Clinical Centers, modeled on
the GRECCS, are now being established.

Medical Preparedness
The final mission, added to the VA in 1982, designates the VA as backup to the Department of Defense
medical care system and to the Public Health Service
and the National Disaster Medical System in times of
natural and technological disasters. The VA has coordinated significant medical support during the hurricanes
and flooding disasters of recent years. It is anticipated
that this function will become even more significant
because of the “devolution of the military healthcare
system . . . [and] because the VA provides many of the
physical resources needed to operationalize federal
disaster plans.”22 In fact, Kizer asserted recently, the
VHA is
for all intents and purposes the federal government’s
only direct response capability. The U.S. Public
Health Service no longer has any resources with
which to respond to a disaster or national emergency.
Likewise, as a result of DOD’s downsizing and its
needs for continuous military readiness, they are
increasingly less able to respond to civilian disasters
or national emergencies.

BALANCING THE MISSIONS
Like their counterparts in the private sector, physicians at VA hospitals are being held accountable for
achieving certain levels of productivity. However,
unlike academic health center M.D.s in the private
sector, and certainly unlike most HMO M.D.s, a larger
proportion of VA physicians both perform research and
provide patient care. The VHA says that more than 70
percent of VA researchers see patients daily. In contrast, only 25 percent of researchers funded by the
National Institutes of Health see patients.23 Therefore,
research activities that can enhance the quality of care
provided can also reduce the clinical productivity of the

physician. A recent report by the GAO highlighted the
difficulties of holding physicians accountable for
certain levels of productivity and suggested that, as
productivity is emphasized, teaching and research
missions may be compromised. The report notes that
this emphasis has led to the loss of talented researchers
in some cases and, in others, to reductions in the
number of students welcome on the clinical services.24

VISION FOR CHANGE:
THE VA’S REFORM PLAN
Armed with a mandate to reconstruct the VA, Kizer
has overseen fundamental changes in the delivery,
management, organization, and philosophy of VA
medical care. These changes include decentralizing
decision-making authority, adopting new eligibility
rules, revising the funding allocation method, shifting
care from inpatient to outpatient settings, enrolling
eligible veterans and assigning them to primary care
teams, and consolidating services across medical
centers.

Decentralization
As a first step toward restructuring the VA, its 173
hospitals have been organized into 22 regional systems
known as Veterans Integrated Services Networks
(VISNs). Each network (drawn primarily on the basis of
patient referral patterns) of providers and facilities
assumes responsibility for the health of a population of
eligible veterans in defined geographic areas. VISN
directors are responsible for budgeting and decisionmaking within their jurisdictions.
While this organizational restructuring may produce
efficiencies and greater flexibility in responding to local
needs, concern is being voiced regarding accountability
and variability in quality. Veterans advocacy groups are
especially concerned about the integrity of the VA’s
specialized services, such as spinal cord injury programs
and prosthetics services. A primary goal of these groups
is to maintain and improve these programs. Even before
reforms were instituted, the GAO cautioned that increasing the demand for routine outpatient services could
hinder the VA’s capacity to provide specialized services.
While they noted that data on unmet needs were not
maintained by the VA, they pointed to several examples
to support their contention that not all veterans’ needs
were being met. Among the examples they provided
were post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) programs.
Although the Vietnam War ended 20 years earlier, the
number of veterans seeking services for PTSD has been
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increasing and programs are operating at or above
capacity, with waiting lists of 900 to 1,000.25

Management and Oversight
In transferring the authority from headquarters to the
22 VISNs, the number of staff members in Washington
was cut by 25 percent, and their role has changed from
program management to policy development and
oversight. Some observers have referred to this as the
balkanization of the VA and have suggested that 22
independent fiefdoms are operating without adequate
central oversight. Although the VISNs have been
instructed to communicate their plans to VA headquarters, decisions are not consistently communicated and
stakeholders are not consistently included in discussions
at the VISN level. At a recent congressional hearing,
the American Legion testified that clinical programs
were being closed without notifying headquarters in
advance.26 One VA official commented that inpatient
substance abuse programs are sometimes closed without
prior notification. In a Senate report (105-53) addressing the VA appropriations bill for 1998, it was suggested that current oversight may be inadequate, and the
VA was requested to submit a plan for improved
monitoring of the networks.

Resource Allocation
There is wide variation in expenditures for patient
care in regions across the country. To address these
marked variations in costs and their inherent inequities,
the VA has moved to an allocation methodology based
not on historical costs but on a prospective capitation
rate per veteran. The new allocation method abolishes
the practice of directly funding each of the VA’s 173
hospitals. The reformed payment method, mandated by
Congress, funds each of the 22 VISNs, with the goal of
securing access for veterans with similar eligibility
priority and economic status, regardless of where they
reside. Funding is based on the number and type of
veterans served, adjusted for factors such as regional
labor costs and case mix. Network directors are responsible for distributing the funds among hospitals, ambulatory care clinics, nursing homes, domiciliaries, and
other treatment facilities within their catchment area.
The funds are provided to the network at the beginning
of the fiscal year with no restrictions on their distribution. Eighty-eight percent of the VA’s medical appropriation is allocated to the networks in this way. The
remaining 12 percent of the appropriation is for central
administration and for restricted clinical uses, such as
for prosthetics and Persian Gulf referral centers.

Under the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation
System (VERA), implemented in April 1997, two
patient care groups have been established, one for basic
care patients and one for special care patients. Basic
care patients are those with relatively routine healthcare
needs who receive their care primarily in outpatient
settings. Ninety-six percent of the VA’s patients receive
basic care, but these patients represent 62 percent of the
dollars allocated. Special care patients—such as terminally ill HIV-positive veterans and those with spinal
cord injuries or chronic mental illness—are highintensity users of VHA services. Although they constitute only 4 percent of VA patients, special care patients
account for 38 percent of the dollars.27
The new allocation methodology will allow the
system to adapt to change and allow funding to follow
the veteran. However, it will also result in losses for the
northern industrial states, the Rust Belt, and increased
funding for the Sunbelt states. States such as New
York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Michigan stand to lose
7 to 15 percent of their funds over the next three years.
States such as Florida, Texas, and Arizona could gain
as much as 16 percent.28
Like any managed care capitated system, VERA
gives the VISNs incentives to attract veterans who do
not require extensive services. VA officials, aware that
there is a potential for gaming, have developed performance measures to discern any unusual changes in
workload, increases in waiting times, or changes in
customer satisfaction.

Eligibility Reform
When queried, about 18 percent of veterans who do
not use the VA health system cited “didn’t know was
eligible” as a reason.29 In fact, Congress has created a
notoriously complex system of eligibility. Especially
prior to 1996, determination of eligibility had been
particularly onerous for both veterans and providers.
VA health care is not an entitlement program like
Medicare or Medicaid. And eligibility for VA services
does not guarantee a defined package of services. Until
1996, all veterans were technically eligible for some
care, although the actual provision of care was based on
the availability of space and resources. But most
otherwise eligible veterans had limited access to outpatient services and the provision of still other services,
such as dental care, was tied to a prior hospital stay.
Reforms enacted in the Veterans Health Care
Eligibility Reform Act of 1996 eliminated the distinctions between inpatient and outpatient care. This erased
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the complicated eligibility restrictions previously
applied to outpatient care. It established two eligibility
categories and seven enrollment priority categories. The
first eligibility category includes veterans to whom the
VA shall furnish needed hospital and outpatient care.
However, as was historically the case, the obligation of
the VA to this group of eligible veterans is effective
only to the extent of appropriated resources. The second
category includes veterans to whom the VA may
furnish care, but only to the extent that resources are
available and only if the veteran pays a copayment for
care. This group comprises higher-income veterans with
non-service-connected disabilities.
Eligibility rules for VA nursing homes and
domiciliaries are unchanged. The VA may provide
these services as clinically appropriate, within available
resources. Veterans with the highest priority for these
services are those with service-connected disabilities
rated at 10 percent or more. Lowest priority is assigned
to veterans who have no other special eligibility status
and whose income exceeds the means test. Currently,
for an individual with no dependents, that income level
is above $21,610.
This legislation also requires the VA to enroll
patients based on priority categories, with the highest
priority given to veterans with service-connected
conditions and indigent veterans. It requires the VA to
maintain system-wide capacity for the 12 specialemphasis programs that include treatment for spinal
cord injury, blindness, amputation, and mental illness.
The legislation permits the VA to provide a continuum
of services by permitting preventive health services to
be delivered even if the veteran is not currently undergoing treatment.
Both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and
GAO concluded that eligibility reform would generate
additional demand for services, primarily due to increased use of outpatient services. The CBO also
estimated that rising utilization would, by extension,
produce dramatically increased costs. GAO noted,
however, that eligibility reform would not address most
veterans’ unmet service needs because
many of the problems veterans face in obtaining
healthcare services appear to relate to distance from a
VA facility or the availability of the specialized
services they need rather than their eligibility to
receive those services from VA.30

Despite the expansion of eligibility, it is not clear
that greater numbers of veterans will be served as,
generally, appropriations have been adequate only for

those veterans in the high-priority groups, such as
service-connected disabled or indigent veterans. However, since enactment of eligibility reform legislation,
the VA has been treating increasing numbers of veterans supporting these new patients through economies
generated from its shift from expensive inpatient care to
outpatient services. Further, eligibility reform legislation did not address the needs of an aging veteran
population or expanded access to nursing home care or
other non-institutional long-term care alternatives.

Primary Care/Ambulatory Care
In the reconfigured system, emphasis is being placed
on primary care as the entry point into a system providing a continuum of services. In FY 1994, less than 20
percent of VA patients were followed by a primary care
provider. Within a two-year period, 77 percent of
patients reported that they were being followed by a
primary care provider, and the VHA reports that, in
actuality, more than 95 percent of patients are enrolled
with a primary care provider. It is anticipated that
universal primary care will be achieved within the next
year.
In the reconfigured system, ambulatory settings are
the preferred site of care. The following statistics
confirm the extent to which this goal has been
achieved.31






Since 1994, 22,580, or 42 percent, of all acute care
hospital beds have been closed.
Ambulatory surgery increased from 35 percent of all
surgery performed in FY 1995 to 69 percent in FY
1997.
Twenty-seven of 121 PTSD programs (22 percent)
have shifted or are in the process of shifting from
inpatient to outpatient.
One hundred and twelve of 190 substance abuse
programs (59 percent) have shifted or are in the
process of shifting from inpatient to outpatient.

QUALITY OF MEDICAL SERVICES
The structural changes taking place at the VHA have
generally been validated by Congress, the VSOs, and
staff internal to the agency. Nevertheless, reports of
compromised quality of care at VHA facilities continue
to surface. Recent newspaper accounts have revealed a
spate of “adverse events” in VA medical centers and
clinics, including scaldings, overdoses, and falls. Criminal investigations continue in Florida VA hospitals into
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the role of employees in the deaths of four patients. The
deaths of 45 patients at a Missouri hospital remain
unexplained. The St. Petersburg Times has reported on
several unusual or avoidable deaths, attributing them to
flawed clinical judgment, failure to verify credentials of
staff physicians, poor physical maintenance, and incompetence among the nursing staff.32
A recent article in the New York Times reports on
similar potentially preventable deaths in upstate New
York. The Office of the Medical Inspector at the VA
reviewed the records of patients who died in two
hospitals in New York State in 1995 and 1996. It
concluded that 6.4 percent of the patients received poor
care and an additional 10.5 percent had received care of
marginal quality.33
The New York Times article suggested that the
problems of quality had been aggravated by the allocation method, which has diverted resources away from
the Northeast. The St. Petersburg Times suggested
other causes for the large number of cases. That article
indicated that no systematic review of medical accidents
has taken place, thus allowing the errors to recur. And,
because the VA does not track the number of unusual
deaths, it is unable to provide a firm accounting of
adverse events within their jurisdiction. In fact, the story
stated, the “VA’s top health care official in Florida
acknowledged he was not aware of the total until he had
the department add up the deaths in response to the [St.
Petersburg] Times’ question.”34
A Senate minority report released on December 19,
1997, questioned the quality of care provided by the
VA healthcare system. In a letter accompanying the
report to secretary-designate Togo D. West, Jr., Sen.
John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W. Va.), the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Veterans
Affairs wrote: “The sad truth is that we can’t accurately
answer the basic question ‘Do our veterans receive the
highest quality of care in VA hospitals and clinics?’”
The report, he said, “shows clearly that the VA simply
does not have the programs and systems in place to
adequately monitor, track and analyze the quality of
care provided.”35
Rather than focusing on specific patient incidents,
the report concentrated on the quality assurance mechanisms established by the VHA to monitor patient care.
The report’s findings included the following:



Although the VA has made many efforts to address
quality of care issues, many of these efforts “were

short lived, poorly executed, poorly tracked . . . and
often abandoned.”





Data may be collected but it is not analyzed and
monitoring does not take place.
The VA has “squandered” many opportunities to
improve quality.
Quality concerns have not been emphasized and the
entire quality management program lacks cohesion.

The report recommended establishing a national advisory board to direct the quality management program,
placing the responsibility for quality assurance directly
under the under secretary for health, and training
employees in quality management practices for a
minimum of 40 hours a year.36
Kizer, in his response, expressed some dismay at the
allegations and the timing of the report. In a letter to
Rockefeller, he noted that the report was issued on the
heels of the VA’s being presented an award for “exceptional work in improving care of those approaching the
end of life . . . when so many efforts have failed to make
an impact.” He also noted that he had just received an invitation to present at the Institute of Medicine’s National
Roundtable for Healthcare Quality. The project director
had invited him after reviewing quality of care indicators
at the VA and requested that he discuss the strategies
used by the VHA for achieving such successes. Much of
the letter provided information documenting “unprecedented improvement in the quality of VA health care.”
He ended by challenging the recommendations, noting
that they had already been addressed.37
Quality will continue to be a challenge and issue for
the VHA. In addition to the report recently issued by
Rockefeller, a second report will be released in the
middle of February. At the request of Sen. Arlen Spector
(R-Pa.), the chairman of the Senate Veterans Affairs
Committee, and Rockefeller, the ranking minority
member, the Office of the Inspector General is evaluating the VHA’s current quality assurance activities. In the
letter requesting this evaluation, it was noted,
our concern is based on our sense that the various
elements of the Department’s overall QA effort are not
functioning so as to assure those with an interest in the
system that the quality of care is being monitored
appropriately, effectively and in a timely manner.38

Additionally, it is anticipated that the Senate Committee
on Veterans Affairs will hold an oversight hearing on
quality in March.
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FUNDING
Funding for the medical care programs of the VA is
through an annual discretionary appropriation. Of the
$40.1 billion appropriation to the VA in FY 1997, $17
billion was for medical care services. The president’s
budget request of $17.5 billion for FY 1998, although
presented as an increase over FY 1997 levels, actually
represented a decrease of more than $54 million. According to VHA Budget Office figures, the total request
represented $16.959 billion in appropriated funds and
$468 million in recovered third-party reimbursements
that previously had been returned to the treasury.
It has been a goal of the VA, the VSOs, and Congress to diversify the funding sources available to the
VA in order to reduce its reliance on the federal appropriation process. The administration request was also
accompanied by two legislative proposals that would
have permitted the VA to achieve that goal. Under prior
law, the VA could collect private third-party reimbursements but had to transfer the collected funds to the
treasury after subtracting the administrative costs
associated with realizing the recoveries. Although many
VA patients are eligible for Medicare, existing law
prohibits the VA from seeking reimbursement from the
Medicare program.
The proposals accompanying the administration’s
FY 1998 budget would have changed those policies.
They called for permitting the VA to retain all private
third-party collections and for setting up a Medicare
subvention demonstration project that would pilot a
method of determining the billing relationship with
Medicare for dual-eligible veterans. While the recovery
piece passed, the Medicare subvention initiative was
ultimately omitted from the authorization bill. Given the
uncertainty of recoveries, Congress stipulated that if the
VA collections fell more than $25 million short of that
projected, automatic spending provisions would protect
VA healthcare funding.
Although VSOs have long advocated for the right to
retain third-party recovered funds, those recovered
funds were always viewed by the veterans' community
as an enhancement to the budget and not as a substitute
for appropriated funds. The VSOs now oppose this
initiative because they note, as stated by the Vietnam
Veterans of America, that this “tenuous proposal offers
no security whatsoever for sufficient and sustained
funding, because . . . the collection targets are untested,
extraordinarily optimistic, and very tenuous at best.”39
The president’s budget and the administration’s
decision to hold the federal appropriation to about $18

billion a year for the next five years inflamed the VSOs.
Had Congress passed the Medicare subvention initiative, the VHA would still have had only about $18.5
billion in fiscal year 2002. What riled the veterans’
community was a budget analysis that projected that
$20.6 billion would be required in 2002 for the VA to
maintain its current workload. The Paralyzed Veterans
of American, a small but influential VSO, maintained
that the budget presented “an unprecedented attack on
veterans.”40
The VA budget is predicated on increasing the
number of veterans served and achieving increased
efficiencies within the system. Particularly, says the
VHA, it is based on reducing by 30 percent the cost of
care on a per patient basis, increasing by 20 percent the
number of veterans served, and increasing to 10 percent
of its operating budget revenues from non-appropriated
sources. The VSOs have expressed skepticism that such
goals can be achieved.
The VA appropriation for FY 1988 was signed into
law on October 27, 1997. It included an appropriation
for medical care of $17.057 billion, representing a
slight increase from fiscal year 1997. The appropriation
for medical and prosthetic research was $272 million,
an increase of $10 million over the previous year.

THE VA AT THE CROSSROADS
Over the years, the VA’s healthcare system has built
up a loyal cadre of defenders. Chief among these
groups are the VSOs. The VSOs acknowledge the need
for change and are generally supportive of the efforts
under way, recognizing their inevitability. They maintain, however, that they, along with other stakeholders
such as the academic affiliates, have not been adequately involved in decisions affecting the way VA care
is delivered. Rather, they assert,
network managers fall back on the predictable formula of calling veterans’ groups and others to the
table at the last minute to present leadership’s decisions. Last-minute information does not equate to
meaningful involvement in the decisionmaking
process and does not produce the same result.41

Despite their support for change, the VSOs are
adamant in their refusal to allow the system to be dismantled and incorporated into the larger system. They
cite the VA’s “unparalleled expertise and resources” in
providing certain specialized services, such as spinal
cord injury care and prosthetic services, and the limited
availability of these services in the private sector.42 They
also note that, since the federal government created
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veterans, it is the federal government’s responsibility to
take care of those who have earned their benefits
through personal sacrifice on behalf of the United
States. Therefore, they maintain, veterans’ programs
should always be viewed as a priority for funding.43

ing budgets and increasing scrutiny and a continued
demand for enhancing the quality of care provided.

The VSOs are not only concerned about protecting
a separate system of care or about their inclusion in
decision making. Of even greater concern to them is the
potential for cost considerations to take precedence over
patient needs. They fear that adequate steps have not
been taken to prevent the incentives inherent in a
capitated system to compromise care. Of particular
concern are the special-emphasis programs, “the
shining jewel of the VA.” Veterans are fearful that with
so much attention being paid to cost control, access will
be restricted to these resource-intensive services.
Reacting to such fears, Kizer suggests that incentives in
the VA are quite different from those in the private
sector. “Since VA has no shareholders and pays no
dividends . . . any savings that are achieved go back into
taking care of more patients or doing a better job of
taking care of its current patients.” Unlike for-profit
managed care companies, savings are not diverted to
higher executive salaries and bonuses. In fact, Kizer
suggests that, because the incentives are so different,
the VA may be one of the few entities able to test
whether managed care is a better model than traditional
indemnity insurance.44

Kenneth W. Kizer, M.D., M.P.H., the VA's under
secretary for health, will provide an overview of the
history and goals of restructuring the VHA. Dr. Kizer's
professional experience prior to joining the VA includes positions in the private sector, philanthropy, and
academia as well as in state government, where for over
six years he served as director of California's Department of Health Services. He has held senior academic
positions at the University of California, Davis, and
continues as an adjunct professor of public policy at the
University of Southern California. He has also served
on the boards of a number of professional societies and
been a consultant to several foreign countries. Dr. Kizer
is board certified in five medical specialties and has
authored over 300 articles, book chapters, and reports
in the medical literature.

CONCLUSION
The VA is at a crossroads. While it is moving to a
system in which primary care is the norm, the GAO
points out that “the VA health care system was neither
designed nor intended to be the primary source of
health care services for most veterans.”45 Although
there is agreement that the VA’s special services are
unparalleled in excellence, some observers suggest that
those services can be cut loose and incorporated into the
larger healthcare system. Others, such as Jordan Cohen,
M.D., president of the Association of American Medical Colleges, dismiss that option by noting that
one of the main reasons for the success of the VA’s
unique programs for patients with special needs is the
infrastructure provided by comprehensive VA medical
centers. This common support system is the necessary
foundation upon which VA builds expertise in the
specialized areas such as cardiac care, long term care,
and substance abuse treatment.46

Whatever form it takes, the escalating competition for
federal dollars will force the VA to deal with diminish-
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Laura Miller, M.P.A., the VA’s network director
for the VA Health Care System of Ohio, will describe
her regional experience with the restructuring of the
VHA. Ms. Miller is responsible for six inpatient VA
facilities, one independent outpatient clinic, and six
active community-based outpatient clinics (CBOCs) in
the state. Ten pending CBOCs are in the planning
stages in the network. She began her career in 1978 as
a presidential management intern and, after advancing
through several top management positions—including
director of VA Medical Center Pittsburgh, Highland
Drive—was appointed to her current position in 1995.
Richard B. Fuller, national legislative director of
Paralyzed Veterans of America, will discuss the concerns of veterans as consumers of care, addressing
especially issues of quality and access. Mr. Fuller served
for eight years on the professional staff of the House
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, with primary responsibilities in the areas of veterans’ health and education
legislation. Since 1987, he has worked in the field of
public policy and government relations, specializing in
health policy for a wide variety of health advocacy,
consumer health research, and provider nonprofit
organizations in Washington, D.C.
Richard Ryan, Jr., D.Sc., president and chief
executive officer of the University of Osteopathic
Medicine and Health Sciences in Des Moines, Iowa,
will comment on the VHA restructuring from the
medical school–research community perspective. Dr.
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Ryan’s association with federal medicine and the VA
began as a disabled Korean War patient at the Bricksvill
VA Hospital in Fairview Heights Ohio in 1955. Since
that time, Dr. Ryan has had more than 30 years’ experience in numerous dean’s positions at Harvard University and Tufts University, has served as a member of the
Special Medical Advisory Group of the VA, and has
been a consultant to the Paralyzed Veterans of America
and the Disabled American Veterans; he is considered
by many to be a leading expert on academic medicine
and federal health services. From 1974 to 1977, Dr.
Ryan served as director of the West Roxbury, Massachusetts, VA Hospital and as director of the First
Medical District in New England. He holds a doctoral
degree in health services administration from Harvard
University School of Public Health.
Stephen P. Backhus, M.B.A., director of veterans’
affairs and military health care (VA&MHC) issues at
the U.S. General Accounting Office, will provide the
GAO’s perspective on the VHA restructuring. Since
joining the GAO since 1973, Mr. Backhus has served in
many different capacities. In his current assignment, he
is responsible for evaluating the healthcare systems of
the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of
Defense, the Indian Health Service, and the Bureau of
Prisons. He is also responsible for evaluating programs
providing certain nonhealth benefits, such as disability
compensation and pensions, to veterans and their
dependents or survivors. Immediately prior to accepting
this position, he was the associate director for
VA&MHC issues and for six years was an assistant
director responsible for evaluating the military’s $15
billion per year healthcare system.
The discussion will center on the following questions:







What are the unique features and role of the VA
healthcare system? Should it continue to be a separate system or should care be incorporated into the
larger healthcare system?
What are the implications for the VHA of a diminishing number of veterans and an aging population?
Are changes needed in VHA services as a result of
the aging veteran population? What should be the
policy relative to long-term care? What are the
implications for various elderly subgroups? Those
with spinal cord injuries? Gulf War Syndrome?
Substance abuse?
How is the VHA’s version of managed care affecting patient outcomes? Are the incentives inherent in
a capitated system jeopardizing care? Are they

undermining the VHA’s mission to provide specialized care to specialized veteran patient populations?
Is managed care compromising the safety net mission of the VA?










How can the VHA assure the veteran population of
high-quality, accessible care?
How do changes in Medicare and Medicaid policies
affect the veteran population? To what extent do the
populations served by these programs and by the
VHA overlap? Should eligibility requirements be
changed as policy changes occur in the larger
healthcare system?
Have state health reforms affected the number of
low-income veterans using the VA? What impact
will this have on future funding needs?
Are changes needed in the VHA’s role as a safety
net provider? What are the barriers to fulfilling the
VHA’s safety net mission? What subgroups of the
safety net population are not being served? Have
state health reforms affected the number of lowincome veterans using the VA? What impact will
this have on future funding needs?
What are the internal mechanisms or external
yardsticks that the VA will use to guide itself or be
held accountable to its users and stakeholders?
Are there further efficiencies to be achieved in the
VA’s healthcare system? Will the missions of the
VHA be compromised by pushing for further efficiencies?

The Forum thanks Gregg Pane, M.D., Chief, Office of
Policy, Planning and Performance, Veterans Health
Administration, for providing or verifying much of the
VHA data in this paper.

ENDNOTES
1. Kenneth W. Kizer, “The Changing Face of the Veterans
Affairs Health Care System,” Minnesota Medicine, 80
(1997): 24-28.
2. Kenneth W. Kizer, ed., Vision for Change, A Plan to
Restructure the Veterans Health Administration, Washington,
D.C., Department of Veterans Affairs, 1995.
3. John Iglehart, “Reform of the Veterans Affairs Health
Care System,” New England Journal of Medicine, 335
(1996), no. 18: 1407-1411.

13
4. Dennis W. Snook, “Veterans Issues in the 105th Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C., updated
May 21, 1997.
5. General Accounting Office, VA Health Care, Issues
Affecting Eligibility Reform Efforts, Washington, D.C.,
September 1996.
6. Kizer, “The Changing Face.”
7. General Accounting Office, VA Health Care, Improving
Veterans’ Access Poses Financial and Mission-Related
Challenges, Washington, D.C., October 1996.
8. Kizer, Vision for Change.
9. Nancy J. Wilson and Kenneth W. Kizer, “The VA Health
Care System: An Unrecognized National Safety Net,” Health
Affairs, 16 (1997), no. 4: 200-204.
10. Kenneth W. Kizer and Gregg A. Pane, “The ‘New VA’:
Delivering Health Care Value through Integrated Service
Networks,” Annals of Emergency Medicine, 30 (December
1977), no. 6.
11. National Survey of Veterans, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, D.C., 1992.
12. General Accounting Office, VA Health Care, Opportunities for Service Delivery Efficiencies within Existing Resources, Washington, D.C., July 1996.
13. Wilson and Kizer, “The VA Health Care System.”
14. American Veterans of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam
(AMVETS); Disabled American Veterans (DAV); Paralyzed
Veterans of America (PVA); Veterans of Foreign Wars of the
United States (VFW), Independent Budget for Veterans
Programs, Promises to Keep . . . Fiscal Year 1998, Washington, D.C., 1997.
15. John Kurtzke, “On the Role of Veterans in the Development of Neurology in the United States: A Personal Reflection,” Neurology, 49 (1997): 323-333.
16. Chuck Hutchcraft, “Revolution in Health Care Reaches
the VA,” Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1996.
17. General Accounting Office, “VA Health Care, Lessons
Learned from Medical Facility Integrations,” statement of
Stephen P. Backhus, director, Veterans’ Affairs and Military
Health Care Issues, before the Subcommittee on Health and
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, July
24, 1997.
18. Department of Veterans Affairs, Report of the Residency
Realignment Review Committee, Washington, D.C., 1996.
19. “VHA Examines Training Programs,” U.S. Medicine, 33
(November 1997), nos. 21 and 22: 1, 42-43.
20. Department of Veterans Affairs, Final Report and
Recommendations of the Research Realignment Committee to
the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, D.C., 1996.

21. AMVETS et al., Independent Budget.
22. Kenneth W. Kizer, Maria L. Fonseca, and Laurel L. Long,
“The Veterans Healthcare System: Preparing for the TwentyFirst Century,” Hospital and Health Services Administration,
42 (1997) no. 3: 283-298.
23. AMVETS et al., Independent Budget.
24. U.S. General Accounting Office, VA Health Care, VA is
Adopting Managed Care Practices to Better Manage Physician Resources, Washington, D.C., July 1997.
25. GAO, Issues Affecting Eligibility Reform Efforts.
26. The American Legion, “Reviewing VA’s Integration
Process for Medical Facility Management and Clinical and
Support Services,” testimony of John Vitikacs, assistant
director, National Legislative Commission, presented to the
Subcommittee on Health and the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, U.S.
House of Representatives, July 24, 1997.
27. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Equitable
Resource Allocation System, Initial Briefing Booklet, Washington, D.C., January 1997.
28. VA, Initial Briefing Booklet.
29. U.S. General Accounting Office, VA Health Care,
Retargeting Needed to Better Meet Veterans’ Changing
Needs, Washington, D.C., April 1995.
30. GAO, Issues Affecting Eligibility Reform Efforts.
31. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA Reengineering:
Selected Results in Brief, Washington, D.C., November 24,
1997.
32. David Dahl, “Fatal Mistakes,” St. Petersburg Times, June
15, 1997.
33. Joseph Berger, “Care at 2 Veterans Hospitals is Criticized,” New York Times, February 2, 1998.
34. Dahl, “Fatal Mistakes.”
35. Bill McAllister, “Quality of Vets’ Health Care Questioned,” Washington Post, December 20, 1997.
36. U.S. Senate. Committee on Veterans’ Affairs (minority
staff), “Staff Report on Quality Management in the Veterans
Health Administration Department of Veterans Affairs,”
Washington, D.C., December 19, 1997.
37. Letter from Kenneth W. Kizer, under secretary for health,
Department of Veterans Affairs, to Sen. John D. Rockefeller
IV, ranking minority member, Committee on Veterans
Affairs, U.S. Senate, January 13, 1998.
38. Letter from Sen. Arlen Spector, chairman, and Sen. John
D. Rockefeller IV, ranking minority member, Committee on
Veterans’ Affairs, U.S. Senate, to William T. Merriman,
acting inspector general, Department of Veterans Affairs,
March 27, 1997.

14
39. Vietnam Veterans of America, “Balanced Budget ‘Deal’
Gives Veterans the Shaft,” The VVA Veteran, June-July,
1997; accessed at http://www.vva.org/TheVeteran/06_1997/
gov-rel.htm, February 13, 1998.
40. Paralyzed Veterans of American, news release, May 21,
1997.
41. AMVETS et al., Independent Budget.
42. AMVETS et al., Independent Budget.
43. AMVETS et al., Independent Budget.
44. Kenneth W. Kizer, personal communication, 1997.
45. GAO, Issues Affecting Eligibility Reform Efforts.
46. Association of American Medical Colleges, Statement on
Consolidation of VA Medical Facilities, presented by Jordan
J. Cohen, president, before the Subcommittee on Health and
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, July
24, 1997.

